Judgment

When making substituted judgments for incapacitated patients, surrogates often struggle to guess what the patient would want if they had capacity. Surrogates may also agonize over having the (sole) responsibility of making such a determination. To address such concerns, a Patient Preference Predictor (PPP) has been proposed that would use an algorithm to infer the treatment preferences of individual patients from population-level data about the known preferences of people with similar demographic characteristics. However, critics have suggested that even if such a PPP were more accurate, on average, than human surrogates in identifying patient preferences, the proposed algorithm would nevertheless fail to respect the patient's (former) autonomy since it draws on the 'wrong' kind of data: namely, data that are not specific to the individual patient and which therefore may not reflect their actual values, or their reasons for having the preferences they do. Taking such criticisms on board, we here propose a new approach: the Personalized Patient Preference Predictor (P4). The P4 is based on recent advances in machine learning, which allow technologies including large language models to be more cheaply and efficiently 'fine-tuned' on person-specific data. The P4, unlike the PPP, would be able to infer an individual patient's preferences from material (e.g., prior treatment decisions) that is in fact specific to them. Thus, we argue, in addition to being potentially more accurate at the individual level than the previously proposed PPP, the predictions of a P4 would also more directly reflect each patient's own reasons and values. In this article, we review recent discoveries in artificial intelligence research that suggest a P4 is technically feasible, and argue that, if it is developed and appropriately deployed, it should assuage some of the main autonomy-based concerns of critics of the original PPP. We then consider various objections to our proposal and offer some tentative replies.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies are rapidly advancing, enhancing human capabilities across various fields spanning from finance to medicine. Despite their numerous advantages, AI systems can exhibit biased judgements in domains ranging from perception to emotion. Here, in a series of experiments (n = 1,401 participants), we reveal a feedback loop where human-AI interactions alter processes underlying human perceptual, emotional and social judgements, subsequently amplifying biases in humans. This amplification is significantly greater than that observed in interactions between humans, due to both the tendency of AI systems to amplify biases and the way humans perceive AI systems. Participants are often unaware of the extent of the AI's influence, rendering them more susceptible to it. These findings uncover a mechanism wherein AI systems amplify biases, which are further internalized by humans, triggering a snowball effect where small errors in judgement escalate into much larger ones.

Determining the extent to which the perceptual world can be recovered from language is a longstanding problem in philosophy and cognitive science. We show that state-of-the-art large language models can unlock new insights into this problem by providing a lower bound on the amount of perceptual information that can be extracted from language. Specifically, we elicit pairwise similarity judgments from GPT models across six psychophysical datasets. We show that the judgments are significantly correlated with human data across all domains, recovering well-known representations like the color wheel and pitch spiral. Surprisingly, we find that a model (GPT-4) co-trained on vision and language does not necessarily lead to improvements specific to the visual modality, and provides highly correlated predictions with human data irrespective of whether direct visual input is provided or purely textual descriptors. To study the impact of specific languages, we also apply the models to a multilingual color-naming task. We find that GPT-4 replicates cross-linguistic variation in English and Russian illuminating the interaction of language and perception.

Predicting one's own future memory during learning (immediate judgments of learning, JOLs) can reactively alter memory performance. Recent evidence shows that making JOLs is associated with changes in the spontaneous use of learning strategies and that these changes mediate negative effects of immediate JOLs on cued recall of unrelated word pairs. This study tests whether a learning strategy instruction targeted at JOL-induced changes in spontaneous learning strategy use reduces negative JOL reactivity. Two experiments (Experiment 1: N = 193, Experiment 2: N = 200) compared cued recall of related and unrelated word pairs between groups of participants who (a) provided JOLs during study, (b) provided JOLs during study and were instructed to study unrelated pairs using mental imagery (Experiment 1) or any learning strategy (Experiment 2), or (c) did not provide JOLs and did not receive a learning strategy instruction. In both experiments, making JOLs without learning strategy instructions impaired memory performance for unrelated word pairs compared to not making JOLs (negative JOL reactivity). Importantly, learning strategy instructions eliminated negative JOL reactivity. Together with findings on spontaneous learning strategy use, these results indicate that negative JOL reactivity may be due to changes in learning strategy use, aligning with theoretical accounts that attribute negative JOL reactivity to dual-task costs or changes in goals pursued during learning.